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Monday 30 August, 2010
Saturday 3 April, 2010
Us Indians
Here is a lucid account of the status of water-sharing between India and Pakistan. The author, John Briscoe sums with minimum fuss the practical issues and also points to possible solutions. He cites the example of Brazil, and how it has chosen to be generous towards Bolivia and Paraguay, poor neighbours both; he hopes that India too will show such generosity.
I very much doubt it. We may be a tiny bit benevolent to Bangladesh or Nepal even; Pakistan is not a country that makes the milk of generosity flow in Mother India. For one, Pakistan has been foolishly aggressive. Kargil is impossible to forget - the TV has ensured that it will endure at least another generation of viewers. Second, unlike Bolivia and Paraguay, Pakistan is a dangerous country that is capable of causing serious harm to India. Brazil is lucky to be in an alltogether salubrious neighbourhood.
As I pointed in my earlier blog on Bangladesh, India must repair the relationship with the rest of the neighbours. Being generous is only the beginning. The first few movements with Bangladesh suggest that perhaps we can hope for a better future there.
The second point that Briscoe makes - about the media in India - that is a serious and valid criticism. I am often dismayed at the lack of rigorous enquiry by the media towards what the various arms of the government do. The media in India is obsessed with trifles and on sensation; on melodrama and bathos; the level of debate on our weaknesses and our holy cows are so mild and staged, it makes me feel very ashamed indeed.
But the most devastating reality that I have had to face after reading the comments of the internet community in India and Indians is that the young Indians today are so belligerant and so full of themselves - not ready to engage anyone who happens to differ in opinion. As an experiment try this: engage a couple of young adults, say 21 to 30, on any topical issue - be it the women's reservation, Pakistan and US, the state of infrastructure, food prices, education - chances are that they will not have a clue, or they will not be too concerned beyond their immediate issues. Any criticism of the current icons and any attempt to talk about the deep disparities in our society will immediately bring in the most vulgar kind of discourse: religious hatred, caste based hatred, language and region based hatred.
Sometimes I feel that the internet and the TV have not brought the noble and the cililized in us. Reading the interactions and watching the audiences one would think that we are becoming closed and intolerant, unread and uncouth, shrill and surly.
Perhaps these are the sign of times? Perhaps this too will change and the tide will turn.
I very much doubt it. We may be a tiny bit benevolent to Bangladesh or Nepal even; Pakistan is not a country that makes the milk of generosity flow in Mother India. For one, Pakistan has been foolishly aggressive. Kargil is impossible to forget - the TV has ensured that it will endure at least another generation of viewers. Second, unlike Bolivia and Paraguay, Pakistan is a dangerous country that is capable of causing serious harm to India. Brazil is lucky to be in an alltogether salubrious neighbourhood.
As I pointed in my earlier blog on Bangladesh, India must repair the relationship with the rest of the neighbours. Being generous is only the beginning. The first few movements with Bangladesh suggest that perhaps we can hope for a better future there.
The second point that Briscoe makes - about the media in India - that is a serious and valid criticism. I am often dismayed at the lack of rigorous enquiry by the media towards what the various arms of the government do. The media in India is obsessed with trifles and on sensation; on melodrama and bathos; the level of debate on our weaknesses and our holy cows are so mild and staged, it makes me feel very ashamed indeed.
But the most devastating reality that I have had to face after reading the comments of the internet community in India and Indians is that the young Indians today are so belligerant and so full of themselves - not ready to engage anyone who happens to differ in opinion. As an experiment try this: engage a couple of young adults, say 21 to 30, on any topical issue - be it the women's reservation, Pakistan and US, the state of infrastructure, food prices, education - chances are that they will not have a clue, or they will not be too concerned beyond their immediate issues. Any criticism of the current icons and any attempt to talk about the deep disparities in our society will immediately bring in the most vulgar kind of discourse: religious hatred, caste based hatred, language and region based hatred.
Sometimes I feel that the internet and the TV have not brought the noble and the cililized in us. Reading the interactions and watching the audiences one would think that we are becoming closed and intolerant, unread and uncouth, shrill and surly.
Perhaps these are the sign of times? Perhaps this too will change and the tide will turn.
Saturday 16 January, 2010
Google Games
An interesting fact from the google pages - as this article shows, Google shows Arunachal as Chinese to users in China; Indian to the users in India; and disputed to the rest of the world.
I thought I'd check it for myself at the maps.google.com instead. Here's what I see: All of J&K is shown as disputed, all of AP is. However Tibet is shown as Chinese and Taiwan is left to interpretation as it is not on mainland, hence no contiguous boundary. As it happens, google maps don't show international maritime boundaries. So there is no way of knowing.
Tomorrow if India were to claim Bhutan as it's own, would it be seen as disputed by Google? After all, one sovereign nation, India, thinks Bhutan is her's.
Another case: Srinagar is shown as India, Gilgit as Pakistan; and funnily enough, Siachen too is shown as Pakistan!
Further afield, in Palestine, the land between the '49 Armistice and the '74 Ceasefire line is shown under Israel, and not as disputed. It is occupied by Israel.
So, what to make of it all? Siachen is occupied by India, but is shown as Pakistan. But Ein Zivan, for instance is occupied by Israel but not shown as Syria.
Clearly, there is evidence to show that Google it towing the US line - it is in alignment with the overt and covert US foreign policy. It cannot be termed as business sense; it is anything but that. It is jingoistic.
So why can't India, a country that has some clout, not make it difficult for Google? China has. Israel has. Why should India be seen as pusillanimous? I'm all for making it tough for companies like Google - companies who, in the military parlance, are nothing more than mercenaries; ronin.
They should be treated as one.
I thought I'd check it for myself at the maps.google.com instead. Here's what I see: All of J&K is shown as disputed, all of AP is. However Tibet is shown as Chinese and Taiwan is left to interpretation as it is not on mainland, hence no contiguous boundary. As it happens, google maps don't show international maritime boundaries. So there is no way of knowing.
Tomorrow if India were to claim Bhutan as it's own, would it be seen as disputed by Google? After all, one sovereign nation, India, thinks Bhutan is her's.
Another case: Srinagar is shown as India, Gilgit as Pakistan; and funnily enough, Siachen too is shown as Pakistan!
Further afield, in Palestine, the land between the '49 Armistice and the '74 Ceasefire line is shown under Israel, and not as disputed. It is occupied by Israel.
So, what to make of it all? Siachen is occupied by India, but is shown as Pakistan. But Ein Zivan, for instance is occupied by Israel but not shown as Syria.
Clearly, there is evidence to show that Google it towing the US line - it is in alignment with the overt and covert US foreign policy. It cannot be termed as business sense; it is anything but that. It is jingoistic.
So why can't India, a country that has some clout, not make it difficult for Google? China has. Israel has. Why should India be seen as pusillanimous? I'm all for making it tough for companies like Google - companies who, in the military parlance, are nothing more than mercenaries; ronin.
They should be treated as one.
Tuesday 5 January, 2010
India's 'new' military doctrine
This article by Dr. Maleeha Lodhi raises some interesting points.
The summary of the thesis is that India has over-reached and has aspirations that it cannot possibly meet in the future. This has been translated as a show of arrogance and misplaced self-importance.
There is merit to this argument. It is not for the first time that Indian foreign policy has been discussed by people who should know better and by people who ought to be discreet. Our FO mandarins have never shied away from bombast. Pity! It does not behoove a country of India's pedigree to allow such loose talk from its elite.
It would have been far more effective to not discuss the specifics at this stage and to bend all the powers of the mind, statecraft and the military to achieving the vision.
However, let's examine the main points of the new strategy. First the cold-start doctrine. It's been in place since 2004. This doctrine is totally Pak-centric. And that is my first objection. When we sat down to craft a Pak-centric strategy, why did we not at the same time sit to design a China-centric strategy? Surely we have the thinkers in this country and enough experts in geo-politics and military strategies? It seems inconcievable that the only foe which has defeated us does not figure in our primary strategy. Well, perhaps the think-tank is and has a strategy; maybe it is chary of revealing it. If it is so, then kudos, well done!
The cold-start strategy itself has its pros and cons. The ultimate idea of creating smaller and more mobile 'Integrated Battle Groups' (IBG), capable of being deployed on the western front within 96 hours is a laudable one. Since it is being seen as an integrated exercise, the Navy and the Air Force will also bring their respective strengths on board. Whether or not we will even exercise this option and attack Pakistan is very moot. Perhaps a combination of political and tactical events may make it necessary - example: another Paliament-like/Mumbai-like attack by Jihadis and with Al Qaida being chased on Pakistan's western borders, India might think it is the right time to do large-scale damage to specific targets in Punjab or Sindh.
However, I doubt if we would ever think of a controlled strike as a strategy to retaliate against the game of attrition being played in the Kashmir vale - as this article from Walter Ladwig suggests. That game has become far too complicated.
Second, to the articulation of a 'two-front war' - Ms. Lodhi has a pathogenic dislike to anything that the Indians might want to say about themselves that throws them in good light. Is the 'two-front war' only a rhetoric meant to boast about our military prowess of handling two formidable foes at the same time? Is it not a reality for India that there could be a situation in the future where China and Pakistan gang-up on us? Is that too outre? I don't think so. In which case, is it not a smart thing to be prepared for that eventuality? If Raja Mohan is to be believed, the strategic think-tank has not been too active in making these plans. In fact, he raises a far more disturbing point: that under the current political dispensation we have lost at least two opportunities to stake our leadership in this region.
Either way, if there is a move to articulate our defence and offence strategy for the northern border it ought to be welcomed. One only wishes that not too much is divulged - or only misleading bits are divulged. We need to be far more crafty in dealing with China - we need to believe in Chanakyaneeti. The buff and raucous way that we behave in dealing with such matters needs to change, or it needs to be part of a brilliant side-stepping strategy to pull several fast ones. If the latter is true then even as I write and as we speak, we are being out-flanked by the FO mandarins. In which case, FO guys (and gals), Good show!
The only way to figure what is the reality would come from mapping the strategy to the purchases and from the recruitment and from the slow and invisible changes in the command-structure. I'll post something about this later - at the moment I don't even have the starting data. Readers are welcome to direct my attention to links and web resources.
The summary of the thesis is that India has over-reached and has aspirations that it cannot possibly meet in the future. This has been translated as a show of arrogance and misplaced self-importance.
There is merit to this argument. It is not for the first time that Indian foreign policy has been discussed by people who should know better and by people who ought to be discreet. Our FO mandarins have never shied away from bombast. Pity! It does not behoove a country of India's pedigree to allow such loose talk from its elite.
It would have been far more effective to not discuss the specifics at this stage and to bend all the powers of the mind, statecraft and the military to achieving the vision.
However, let's examine the main points of the new strategy. First the cold-start doctrine. It's been in place since 2004. This doctrine is totally Pak-centric. And that is my first objection. When we sat down to craft a Pak-centric strategy, why did we not at the same time sit to design a China-centric strategy? Surely we have the thinkers in this country and enough experts in geo-politics and military strategies? It seems inconcievable that the only foe which has defeated us does not figure in our primary strategy. Well, perhaps the think-tank is and has a strategy; maybe it is chary of revealing it. If it is so, then kudos, well done!
The cold-start strategy itself has its pros and cons. The ultimate idea of creating smaller and more mobile 'Integrated Battle Groups' (IBG), capable of being deployed on the western front within 96 hours is a laudable one. Since it is being seen as an integrated exercise, the Navy and the Air Force will also bring their respective strengths on board. Whether or not we will even exercise this option and attack Pakistan is very moot. Perhaps a combination of political and tactical events may make it necessary - example: another Paliament-like/Mumbai-like attack by Jihadis and with Al Qaida being chased on Pakistan's western borders, India might think it is the right time to do large-scale damage to specific targets in Punjab or Sindh.
However, I doubt if we would ever think of a controlled strike as a strategy to retaliate against the game of attrition being played in the Kashmir vale - as this article from Walter Ladwig suggests. That game has become far too complicated.
Second, to the articulation of a 'two-front war' - Ms. Lodhi has a pathogenic dislike to anything that the Indians might want to say about themselves that throws them in good light. Is the 'two-front war' only a rhetoric meant to boast about our military prowess of handling two formidable foes at the same time? Is it not a reality for India that there could be a situation in the future where China and Pakistan gang-up on us? Is that too outre? I don't think so. In which case, is it not a smart thing to be prepared for that eventuality? If Raja Mohan is to be believed, the strategic think-tank has not been too active in making these plans. In fact, he raises a far more disturbing point: that under the current political dispensation we have lost at least two opportunities to stake our leadership in this region.
Either way, if there is a move to articulate our defence and offence strategy for the northern border it ought to be welcomed. One only wishes that not too much is divulged - or only misleading bits are divulged. We need to be far more crafty in dealing with China - we need to believe in Chanakyaneeti. The buff and raucous way that we behave in dealing with such matters needs to change, or it needs to be part of a brilliant side-stepping strategy to pull several fast ones. If the latter is true then even as I write and as we speak, we are being out-flanked by the FO mandarins. In which case, FO guys (and gals), Good show!
The only way to figure what is the reality would come from mapping the strategy to the purchases and from the recruitment and from the slow and invisible changes in the command-structure. I'll post something about this later - at the moment I don't even have the starting data. Readers are welcome to direct my attention to links and web resources.
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